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INTRODUCTION
The year 2005 marked the tenth anniversary of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' ("TRIPS Agree-
* Copyright © 2007 Peter K. Yu. Associate Professor of Law & Director, Intel-
lectual Property & Communications Law Program, Michigan State University College of
Law; Core Faculty, Asian Studies Center & Adjunct Professor of Telecommunication, In-
formation Studies and Media, Michigan State University; Research Fellow, Center for Stud-
ies of Intellectual Property Rights, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law. An earlier
version of this Essay was presented at the International Conference on the "Impact of
TRIPS-Indo-U.S. Exchange" at NALSAR University of Law in Hyderabad, India. The
Author would like to thank Vice Chancellor Ranbir Singh and Professor V.C. Vivekanandan
for their hospitality and Professor Srividhya Ragavan for her collaborative efforts. He is also
grateful to Alexander Kanous for excellent research and editorial assistance, and to the past
and present members of the Michigan State Law Review, in particular Amanda Fielder,
Emma Haas, Brian Hall, Ross Hammersley, Corinne Miller, Timothy Peterkoski, Nathan
Piwowarski, Alison Quinn, Tyler Rands, Brian Saxe, Kirsten Thomson, for assistance in
making this symposium possible.
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex IC, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
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ment"). Since it entered into effect on January 1, 1995, the Agreement has
impacted a wide variety of areas, including agriculture, health, the environ-
ment, education, culture, competition, free speech, democracy, and the rule
of law. Today, intellectual property protection has been considered a major
issue in both the domestic and international policy debates, and policymak-
ers have actively explored intellectual property issues in many different
international regimes. These regimes cover issues ranging from public
health to human rights and from biological diversity to information and
communications.
As an introduction to this Symposium, this Essay advances three con-
ceptual notions that seek to illuminate the growing complexity of the current
international intellectual property regime---or to be more precise, the cur-
rent international intellectual property regime complex. Part I outlines the
international enclosure movement, in which the policy space of countries,
usually those in the less developed world, is increasingly enclosed in the
name of international harmonization. This Part suggests that the growing
complexity of the international intellectual property regime is partly a re-
sponse to this increased enclosure. Part II examines the concept of the "in-
ternational intellectual property regime complex," a term I coined as the
title of this Symposium to denote a larger conglomerate regime that includes
not only the traditional area of intellectual property laws and policies, but
also the overlapping areas in related regimes or fora. This Part shows that
the international intellectual property regime complex will become increas-
ingly incoherent as it expands and incorporates more issue areas. Part III
focuses on what I describe as "intellectual property schizophrenia," a term I
use to highlight the rather "schizophrenic" positions taken by policymakers
in response to conflicts and competing interests within a country. Focusing
on three different types of conflicts-regional conflicts, sectoral conflicts,
and issue-based conflicts-this Part discusses the additional complexities
within both the domestic and international intellectual property systems.
1. INTERNATIONAL ENCLOSURE
The first notion concerns what I have described elsewhere as the "in-
ternational enclosure movement."2 Although most of the recent intellectual
property literature focuses on the enclosure of the public domain or the up-
ward ratchet of intellectual property protection,3 a different, and perhaps
2. Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827 (2007).
3. For discussions of the enclosure of the public domain and the upward ratchet of
intellectual property protection, see, for example, LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL
CREATIvITY (2004); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354 (1999); James
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more important, enclosure movement is currently taking place at the inter-
national level. Instead of the public domain, this concurrent movement en-
closes the policy space of individual countries in the name of international
harmonization. Unlike the movement to enclose the public domain, which
"fenc[es] off common land and turn[s] it into private property,"4 the interna-
tional enclosure movement fences off areas that provide attractive policy
options for less developed countries. As a result of this enclosure, coun-
tries, especially those in the less developed world, are increasingly forced to
adopt one-size-fits-all legal standards that ignore local needs, national inter-
ests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health
conditions.
When the international intellectual property regime was created in the
nineteenth century, it was designed primarily to patch up the divergent laws
and customs of the participating nations.' The cornerstones of this regime
are the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property6 and the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,7 both of
which were established in the 1880s.
Consider the Paris Convention, for example. When the Convention
was being negotiated, countries disagreed significantly over such issues as
compulsory licenses, parallel importation, working requirements, and filing
systems Some countries, like the Netherlands and Switzerland, did not
have a patent system,9 while others, like Germany, remained heavily influ-
Boyle, Fencing off Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearance of the Public Domain,
DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 13; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Con-
struction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33 [here-
inafter Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II:
Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 21 (2004).
4. Boyle, Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 3, at 33-34.
5. See Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for Interna-
tional Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69, 70 (1998).
6. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, re-
vised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Con-
vention].
7. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
8. See Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual
Property Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 323, 349 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents].
9. For a discussion of the Netherlands and Switzerland during the time when they
did not have a patent system while nearly all other industrialized countries had such a system
in place, see generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS
(1971). The Netherlands and Switzerland were not the only countries that did not offer every
form of protection included in the Paris Convention. The United States, for example, re-
mains a member of the Paris Convention, even though it did not offer protection to utility
models and offered limited protection to industrial designs. See Pamela Samuelson, Chal-
lenges for the World Intellectual Property Organisation and the Trade-Related Aspects of
Michigan State Law Review
enced by the anti-patent movement.1" To enable countries to coordinate this
wide range of protection at the international level, the Convention struck a
compromise by allowing each country to decide how intellectual property
was protected within its borders. Instead of creating a system with uniform
rules and standards, the Convention embraced the anti-discrimination prin-
ciple of national treatment" and left considerable room for countries to ex-
periment with different intellectual property systems.
2
In the patent area, for example, countries could decide whether they
wanted to include a local working requirement or a compulsory licensing
provision. They could also explore whether the protection of patents in
processes provided sufficient incentives or whether they needed to extend
protection to products as well. Countries could even determine whether
they wanted to protect patents in the first place-as in the case of the Neth-
erlands and Switzerland.
Although the Paris Convention worked well for developed countries
for decades, most less developed countries were not able to enjoy the auton-
omy countries traditionally enjoyed in the Convention. Instead, intellectual
property laws were transplanted from developed countries onto their soil
through colonial laws. As Ruth Okediji explained:
Intellectual property law was not merely an incidental part of the colonial legal ap-
paratus, but a central technique in the commercial superiority sought by European
powers in their interactions with each other in regions beyond Europe. Granted,
intellectual property systems in Europe prior to the seventeenth century were nei-
ther fully developed nor had intellectual property protection become a systematic
policy designed primarily for encouraging domestic innovation. Whatever protec-
tions existed, however, would be exerted against other Europeans in colonial terri-
tories in the process of empire building. The [early period of European contact
through trade with non-European peoples] thus was characterized predominantly
by the extension of intellectual property laws to the colonies for purposes associ-
Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property Rights in the Infor-
mation Age, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 578, 579 (1999).
10. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 349. For discussions of
the anti-patent movement, see generally Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Reevaluation of
the International Patent Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765 (1947); Fritz Machlup
& Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1
(1950).
11. See Paris Convention, supra note 6, art. 2 (providing for the national treatment
of foreign rights holders).
12. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 9-16 (1975) (discussing the "laboratory effects"
of legal innovation); Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministe-
rial Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219,
238 (2004) (discussing the "laboratory effect" of regionalism, which allows countries to
experience trial-and-error and learning-by-doing techniques at the regional level); John F.
Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 707-08
(2002) (discussing how countries can develop legal systems by experimenting with new
regulatory and economic policies through interjurisdictional competition).
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ated generally with the overarching colonial strategies of assimilation, incorpora-
tion and control. It was also characterized by efforts to secure national economic
interests against other European countries in colonial territories.'
3
Even after these colonies became independent, many of the intellec-
tual property laws that were originally transplanted from the former control-
ling powers remained on the books. These laws either survived state suc-
cession or had been retroactively adopted as part of the post-independence
national law. 4 As Professor Okediji observed further:
It is well-known... that most developing countries retained the structure and form
of laws and institutions established during the colonial period, including intellec-
tual property laws. Until 1989, Lesotho operated under the Patents, Trade Marks
and Designs Protection Proclamation of 1919, a United Kingdom instrument.
Mauritius, a former French colony, continued to operate under its Trade Marks Act
(1868) and Patents Act (1975) for over twenty years after obtaining independence
in 1968. Swaziland also inherited its IP regime "as a colonial legacy." The same
is true with respect to other laws and institutions. Indeed, prior to the compelled
compliance with intellectual property rights imposed by the TRIPS Agreement,
many developing and least developed countries still had as their own domestic
laws the old Acts and Ordinances of the colonial era. While some developing
countries had laws in place that attracted the ire of the developed countries by ex-
plicit refusals to grant patents to pharmaceutical products, or through compulsory
licensing provisions, or by the failure to enforce recognized rights, many others
simply had obsolete laws.
15
Nevertheless, the decolonization effort and the subsequent emergence
of less developed countries called into question the extent of protection in
the international intellectual property regime. During the 1967 Stockholm
Revision Conference of the Berne Union, India and other less developed
countries demanded special concessions in the international copyright sys-
tem in light of their divergent economic, social, cultural, and technological
conditions. 6 The revision conference eventually led to the creation of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the inclusion of the
Protocol Regarding Developing Countries in the Berne Convention. 7
13. Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives
of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J.
INT'L & COMp. L. 315, 324-25 (2003) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Okediji, International
Relations of Intellectual Property].
14. For an excellent discussion of how the former colonies conducted their interna-
tional intellectual property relations following their declarations of independence, see id. at
325-34.
15. Id. at 335-36 & n.73 (footnotes and citations omitted).
16. See Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copy-
right-Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1065 (1968). For a detailed discussion
of the origin and aftermath of the Stockholm Protocol, see SAM RICKETSON & JANE C.
GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION
AND BEYOND 879-963 (2d ed. 2005).
17. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 328.
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In the mid-1970s, less developed countries further demanded a revi-
sion of the Paris Convention to lower the minimum standards of intellectual
property protection as applied to them and to expand compulsory licenses
available under the Convention." Through the efforts of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), countries also worked
together to develop a draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology. 9
These demands, to which the United States objected vehemently,
eventually precipitated the famous stalemate between developed and less
developed countries in the 1981 Diplomatic Conference in Nairobi. Led by
the United States and heavily influenced by multinational corporations, de-
veloped countries responded to this stalemate by abandoning the intellectual
property-based forum in favor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT),2" a trade-based forum which eventually expanded into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). After close to a decade of negotiations,
and some threats of trade sanctions by the United States, countries finally
agreed to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation,2 which included in its annex a multilateral agreement on intellectual
property rights known as the TRIPS Agreement.
Based on models from technology-rich countries, this Agreement re-
made the international intellectual property regime by strengthening protec-
tion in at least four significant ways. First, it established minimum stan-
dards for intellectual property protection and achieved new international
consensus on the protection of emerging technologies and subject matters.
For example, article 10(2) states that "[c]omputer programs, whether in
source or object code, shall be protected as literary works under the Berne
Convention (1971).22 Article 23 offers special protection to geographical
indications for wines and spirits." Article 27(1) stipulates that "patents...
be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the
place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are im-
ported or locally produced."24 Article 27(3)(b) requires each member state
to "provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an
18. See id. at 357.
19. For a collection of essays discussing the draft code of conduct concerning inter-
national technology transfer, see INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND
AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT (Suren-
dra J. Patel, Pedro Roffe & Abdulqawi Yusuf eds., 2001).
20. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 357-58 (discussing the
shifting of the negotiating forum by developed countries from WIPO to the WTO).
21. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 1.
22. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10(2).
23. Id. art. 23.
24. Id. art. 21.
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effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof."25 Article 35
offers protection to integrated circuit topographies by reference to the
Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated
Circuits.2"
As I pointed out elsewhere, these heightened standards are particularly
important because they transformed the international intellectual property
regime from an international framework to a global one.27 Traditionally,
treaties within the international intellectual property regime, such as the
Berne or Paris Conventions, were largely introduced to patch up the diver-
gent protections in various national systems. In light of this patchwork ef-
fort, countries tended to focus only on the minimum standards, or the pro-
tection floor, when they negotiated international treaties. The TRIPS
Agreement, however, altered that setup by imposing a "supranational code"
on the weaker WTO member states despite their limited economic devel-
opment."8 Because the code now requires higher standards than are appro-
priate for these countries, the focus on minimum standards becomes mis-
guided, and the lack of maximum international standards has made it diffi-
cult for countries to respond to massive domestic problems, such as the
widely-reported public health crises concerning HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other epidemics.29
Second, the TRIPS Agreement expanded the coverage of intellectual
property protection to eight different areas. In addition to copyrights, pat-
ents, and trademarks, which are the three main branches of intellectual prop-
erty, the Agreement also covers geographical indications, industrial designs,
plant variety protection, integrated circuit topographies, and protection of
undisclosed information. Such coverage is remarkable because a number of
these areas did not attain international consensus before the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement. As Jayashree Watal, the former negotiator for India and
a current WTO official, pointed out, "at least one, undisclosed information,
has never been the subject of any multilateral agreement before, and an-
other, protection for integrated circuit designs, had no effective international
25. Id. art. 27(3)(b).
26. Id. art. 35.
27. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 2, at 901-06.
28. See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" of National
Copyright Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 265, 267-76
(2000) (discussing the transformation from international agreements to a supranational code);
accord Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 354-75.
29. See Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv.
369, 402 (2006) (discussing the need for including maximum standards in international intel-
lectual property agreements).
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treaty, while others, like plant variety protection or performers' rights, were
geographically limited. 30
Third, through complex procedures and burdensome obligations, the
TRIPS Agreement significantly curtailed the ability of less developed coun-
tries to design an intellectual property system that is tailored to local needs,
interests, and goals. The three-step test in articles 13 and 30 and a similar
test in article 17 have made it particularly difficult for countries to create
new limitations or exceptions in their copyright, patent, and trademark sys-
tems. 3' Article 31 also includes a set of complex procedural rules delineat-
ing the conditions under which a country can issue a compulsory license.32
Although these rules have been relaxed lately by the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), the Decision
on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, and the recently adopted protocol to
formally amend the Agreement by adding a ne:.: article 31 bis,33 it remains to
be seen whether two-thirds of the WTO membership will ratify the pro-
posed amendment before December 1, 2007."4
30. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 4 (2001).
31. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 13, 17, 30.
32. Id. art. 31.
33. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002); Decision of the General Council of 30 August
2003, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004) (regarding the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health); Decision of the General
Council of 6 December 2005, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005) (regarding the protocol amending
the TRIPS Agreement), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/w-
tl641_e.htm.
34. As of October 1, 2007, only ten out of 151 member states (the United States,
Australia, Switzerland, El Salvador, South Korea, Norway, India, Israel, Japan, and the Phil-
ippines) have ratified the proposed amendment. WTO, Countries Accepting Amendment of
the TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/tripse/amendmente.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2007). If an insufficient number of members ratify the protocol, the tempo-
rary waivers granted by the Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health will remain in force. The deadline for rati-
fication may also be extended. Nevertheless, commentators have expressed concern about
such delay. As Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman recently noted:
[F]rom a strictly legal standpoint there is no apparent risk from delay (or rejection)
of the Amendment. However, the authors have serious concerns that industry in-
terests and supporting governments would use delay or failure of acceptance of the
Amendment as the basis for an aggressive lobbying campaign intended to undercut
the vitality of the waiver. Moreover, there is anecdotal evidence that some gov-
ernments have taken a "wait and see" attitude toward implementation of the Deci-
sion pending formalization via the Amendment.
FREDERICK M. ABBOTT & JEROME H. REICHMAN, ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: LESSONS
LEARNED SINCE THE DORA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH,
AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION iv (2007).
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Finally, the TRIPS Agreement "married" intellectual property to in-
ternational trade and established a dispute settlement process that is manda-
tory for disputes arising under the Agreement. 5 The Agreement, as a result,
has greatly improved the enforceability of international intellectual property
treaties, which hitherto have been virtually unenforceable. 6 The Agreement
also provided developed countries with a process through which they can
induce their less developed trading partners to offer stronger intellectual
property protection. This process includes such measures as consultation,
conciliation, mediation, and finally, dispute settlement. 7 To many com-
mentators, the mandatory dispute settlement process was one of the crown-
ing achievements, if not the crowning achievement, of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations that resulted in the establishment of the
WTO.3"
Although the TRIPS Agreement increased considerably the protection
of intellectual property rights at the international level, significant safe-
guards, flexibilities, and transitional measures exist in the Agreement to
protect less developed countries. For example, article 7 states explicitly that
[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations.
39
Article 8 recognizes the needs of WTO member states to "adopt measures
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and techno-
logical development, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement." '4
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 64.
36. As Daniel Gervais noted: "The two fundamental perceived flaws of the Paris and
Berne Conventions were (a) the absence of detailed rules on the enforcement of rights before
national judicial administrative authorities; and (b) the absence of a binding and effective
dispute settlement mechanism (for disputes between states)." DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 10 (2d ed. 2003).
37. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 4-6.
38. See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten
Years, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) ("Dispute settlement is one of the great successes of
the WTO."); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the
Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275,
275 (1997) (noting that the two achievements of the Uruguay Round are, as the title suggests,
"Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together"); Ruth Okediji, Toward an International
Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 149-50 (2000) ("One of the most cele-
brated accomplishments of the WTO system is the dispute resolution mechanism which adds
legitimacy to the overall design of the new trading system." (footnote omitted)).
39. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 7.
40. Id. art. 8(1).
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Article 1 further states that member states are "free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice."'" As Frederick Abbott high-
lighted, this freedom includes at least the following flexibilities:
The TRIPS Agreement... does not... restrict the authority of governments to
i'egulate prices. It . . .permits [compulsory or government-use licenses] to be
granted. It permits governments to authorize parallel importation. The TRIPS
Agreement does not specify that new-use patents must be granted. It allows pat-
ents to be used for regulatory approval purposes, and it does not require the exten-
sion of patent terms to offset regulatory approval periods. The TRIPS Agreement
provides a limited form of protection for submissions of regulatory data; but this
protection does not prevent a generic producer from making use of publicly avail-
able information to generate bioequivalence test data. The TRIPS Agreement pro-
vides substantial discretion for the application of competition laws.42
In addition, through the efforts of skillful negotiators, the TRIPS
Agreement includes many ambiguities that have been intentionally built into
the instrument. As Carlos Correa pointed out, although developed countries
would interpret the word "review" in article 27(3)(b) to mean "review of
implementation," less developed countries are likely to interpret that same
word to suggest the possibility for "revising" the Agreement to meet their
needs and interests.43 Likewise, Sisule Musungu recently reminded us the
different ways of conceptualizing the transitional periods built into the
TRIPS Agreement:
While giving extra time due to administrative and financial constraints was one
aim, the central objective of the LDCs [least developed countries] transition period
under the TRIPS Agreement is different. Article 66.1 of TRIPS read together with
the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement and its objectives under Article 77 envisage
the purpose and objectives of the LDCs transition period to be to respond and ad-
dress: the special needs and requirements of these countries; and the need for
maximum exibility to help these countries create a sound and viable technologi-
cal base.
Thus, Jayashree Watal has described these ambiguous words and
phrases as "constructive ambiguit[ies]. ' '45 These ambiguities are construc-
41. Id. art. 1(1).
42. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and
Trends in Intellectual Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 30 (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey & David Vivas-
Eugui eds., 2006) (citations omitted).
43. CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 211 (2000).
44. SISULE MUSUNGU, A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR PRIORITY IDENTIFICATION
AND DELIVERY OF IP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR LDCs DURING THE EXTENDED TRANSITION
PERIOD UNDER THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 5 (Quaker United Nations Office, Issue Paper No. 7,
2007) - (footnote omitted), available at http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/econ-
omic/Issues/Priority-ID-English.pdf.
45. WATAL, supra note 30, at 7.
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tive, because they provide less developed countries with a bulwark against
the continuous expansion of intellectual property rights. If carefully inter-
preted, they will enable countries to preserve the policy space appropriately
reserved for them during the negotiation process. They may also allow less
developed countries to "'claw[]' back much of what was lost in the negoti-
ating battles in TRIPS."46
Finally, the Agreement recognized the inability of less developed
countries to immediately increase their levels of protection. Article 65 pro-
vided developing and transition countries with a four-year transitional pe-
riod, which has since expired.47 Likewise, article 66 provided least devel-
oped countries with an initial ten-year transitional period,48 which has now
been extended to seventeen and a half years for most products as long as the
country seeking an extension has not yet met the TRIPS requirements or has
already offered protection in excess of those requirements.49 With respect to
pharmaceuticals, the Doha Declaration extended to 2016 the deadline for
least developed countries to offer protection. 0 Article 66 further requires
developed countries to provide incentives for their businesses and institu-
tions to help create "a sound and viable technological base" in least devel-
oped countries by promoting and encouraging transfer of technology. 1
Thus, although the TRIPS Agreement has greatly strengthened intel-
lectual property protection while significantly reducing the policy space of
WTO member states, it includes certain safeguards, flexibilities, and transi-
tional measures to help countries "buy time" to update their intellectual
property systems. It also leaves little space for less developed countries to
develop policies that respond to their needs, interests, and goals. Whether
countries will be able to take advantage of these benefits will depend on
their capacity to interpret the Agreement, insist on their interpretations, and
resolve disputes before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.52
Unfortunately for less developed countries, recent years have seen fur-
ther enclosure of their policy space. Whatever limited space the TRIPS
Agreement retained, that space has been further enclosed by the aggressive
46. Id.
47. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 65(2)-(3).
48. Id. art. 66(1).
49. See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Poorest Countries Given More
Time to Apply Intellectual Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.wto.org/en-
glish/news e/pres05_e/pr424 e.htm.
50. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 1 7,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002).
51. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 66(2).
52. See Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement:
Who Participates? Who Decides? The Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protec-
tion, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459, 473-76 (2004) (discussing the limited legal expertise in less
developed countries).
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push by developed countries for TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional trade and
investment agreements-free trade agreements for the United States and
economic partnership agreements for the European Communities." In fact,
the United States' Trade Act of 2002 declared explicitly that
[t]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are.. . to further promote adequate and effective protection of
intellectual property rights, including through. . . ensuring that the provisions of
any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property rights
that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to
that found in United States law .... 54
There are generally three different types of provisions in the so-called
TRIPS-plus agreements: TRIPS-plus provisions, TRIPS-extra provisions,
and TRIPS-restrictive provisions. TRIPS-plus provisions increase the com-
mitments of less developed countries by increasing the protection stated in
the TRIPS Agreement. For example, although the Agreement requires pat-
ent protection for only twenty years, some recent U.S. free trade agreements
have required a limited extension of the patent term based on the period
during which a product undergoes regulatory review." Such an extension is
similar to the extension provided by the United States' Hatch-Waxman Act
of 1984.
TRIPS-extra provisions, by contrast, add new commitments that are
not covered by the TRIPS Agreement. Examples of these provisions in-
clude those calling for the establishment of a data exclusivity regime to pro-
tect clinical trial data submitted during regulatory approval processes; the
linkage of pharmaceutical product registration to patent status; the require-
ment that patents be granted for "new uses," or second indications, of
known compounds; the ban on parallel importation of cheap, generic drugs;
and the use of dispute settlement processes that are different from the one
mandated by the WTO.56 Although the WTO prohibits member states from
taking retaliatory measures before exhausting all of the actions permissible
under its rules, TRIPS-extra provisions are likely to rejuvenate the section
301 process and may lead to greater use of trade threats and unilateral sanc-
tions, as the provisions cover issues outside of the TRIPS Agreement.57
Finally, TRIPS-restrictive provisions neither increase the protection
under the TRIPS Agreement nor cover a new area of protection outside the
Agreement, but nonetheless enclose the policy space of less developed
53. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 392-400 (discussing the
growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A) (2004).
55. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 2, at 868.
56. See id. at 868-69.
57. Panel Report, United States--Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
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countries by restricting how the Agreement is to be interpreted. A textbook
example of such provisions is one that requires less developed countries to
protect plant varieties by introducing the 1991 Act of UPOV (International
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants), notwithstanding the
fact that the TRIPS Agreement allows each member state to decide whether
it wants to offer protection through patents, sui generis protection, or a
combination of both. 8
In sum, the recent bilateral and regional efforts have further enclosed
the already very limited policy space available to countries under the TRIPS
Agreement. As countries struggle to respond, they begin to explore new
alternative fora in their effort to reclaim their lost policy space and roll back
the continuous expansion of intellectual property rights. They also have
actively pushed for the WIPO Development Agenda to level the playing
field and to establish countervailing principles, norms, and rules that they
hope can be later incorporated into the international intellectual property
regime. 9 It remains to be seen whether these countries will be able to re-
spond successfully to the continuous international enclosure or whether
such enclosure will eventually lead to further consolidation that results in
what commentators have referred to as "TRIPS II."'° One thing is for cer-
tain: recent efforts by both developed and less developed countries have
made the international intellectual property regime highly complex.
II. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME COMPLEX
The second notion concerns the "international intellectual property re-
gime complex," a term I coined as the title of this Symposium. The term
"regime complex" originally appeared in Kal Raustiala and David Victor's
article in International Organization, entitled The Regime Complex for
Plant Genetic Resources.6 Stephen Krasner defined international regimes
as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations."'62 Expanding on this definition, Professors Raustiala
and Victor defined an international regime complex as "a collective of par-
58. See Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 2, at 869.
59. For a discussion of WIPO and its new Development Agenda, see generally
CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: RESURGENCE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (2007).
60. See, e.g., GERVAIS, supra note 36, at 48; Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Interna-
tional Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors, New Institutions, New Sources, 98 AM.
SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 213, 217 (2004); Dreyfuss, supra note 3.
61. Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Re-
sources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 279 (2004).
62. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
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tially overlapping and even inconsistent regimes that are not hierarchically
ordered, and which lack a centralized decisionmaker or adjudicator." 3 As
they explained:
Regime complexes are marked by the existence of several legal agreements that are
created and maintained in distinct fora with participation of different sets of actors.
The rules in these elemental regimes functionally overlap, yet there is no agreed
upon hierarchy for resolving conflicts between rules. Disaggregated decision mak-
ing in the international legal system means that agreements reached in one forum
do not automatically extend to, or clearly trump, agreements developed in other fo-
rums .... [R]egime complexes [therefore] evolve in ways that are distinct from
decomposable single regimes.64
A couple of years earlier, David Leebron also advanced the concept of
a "'conglomerate' regime."65 As Professor Leebron described, conglomer-
ate regimes
are regimes that remain somewhat separate, in terms of both norms and institu-
tional structures, within an overarching regime. Like corporate conglomerates,
they are marked by important institutional relationships and perhaps common poli-
cies among the constituent parts, but also by institutional separation. In this sense,
the ongoing relationship between the distinct areas might still be characterized as
linkage rather than scope, but in terms of the above analysis such conglomerates
are hybrids.
66
In the intellectual property area, a regime complex or a conglomerate
regime includes both the traditional international intellectual property re-
gime and those other international regimes or fora in which intellectual
property issues play a growing role or with which formal or informal link-
ages have been established. Examples of these related regimes or fora in-
clude those governing public health, human rights, biological diversity, food
and agriculture, and information and communications. As the world be-
comes more globalized and interdependent, other seemingly unrelated issue
areas may find their way into this regime complex. In fact, as Professors
Raustiala and Victor predicted, "regime complexes will become much more
common in coming decades as international institutions proliferate and in-
evitably bump against one another."67
In a recent article, Professor Raustiala described succinctly four im-
portant implications of an international regime complex for world politics
and the development of legal rules. First, due to the many overlapping rules
and institutions in a regime complex, "new international rules and institu-
tions are rarely negotiated on a clean slate. As a result rulemakers are not
63. Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1021, 1025 (2007).
64. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 61, at 279.
65. David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 18 (2002).
66. Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 61, at 306.
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able to choose any substantive legal rule(s) they might favor; frequently
they are limited by the existing constellation of rules and, most importantly,
the political interests these rules have engendered."68 Second, because of
the multiple fora, institutions, and issue areas involved in a regime complex,
intensified forum-shopping activities are likely to exist." After all, different
"fora have different rules of access, membership, and participation[;] they
empower and disempower distinct actors."7  Third, "[a]s substantive IP
rules multiply, they increasingly conflict and compete with one another.
[Because t]hese conflicts are sometimes anticipated, and even desired[,
countries and institutions have undertaken] .. .deliberate efforts at rule
change via competing agreements and conflicting rules."'" Finally, because
of a lack of well-specified doctrines governing the resolution of conflicts
between inconsistent international rules, "[r]enegotiation or political resolu-
tion of a conflict is . . .often more likely than adjudication" in a regime
complex. Negotiators will also "deploy devices such as 'savings clauses'
... to demarcate boundaries between regimes and disentangle events in one
forum from another."73
As the international intellectual property regime complex evolves,
countries from both the developed and less developed worlds have been
actively engaging in what commentators describe as "regime shifting" or
"forum shifting."74 As Laurence Helfer defined it, regime shifting is "an
attempt to alter the status quo ante by moving treaty negotiations, lawmak-
ing initiatives, or standard setting activities from one international venue to
another."75 An "intra-regime shift" reflects a move from one venue to an-
other venue situated within the same regime-for example, from bilateral
intellectual property agreements to a multilateral intellectual property con-
vention.76 By contrast, an "inter-regime shift" reflects a move from one
venue to another venue located in an entirely different regime-for exam-
ple, from the intellectual property regime to the public health or human
rights regime.77 While developed countries have recently moved vertically
68. Raustiala, supra note 63, at 1026.
69. See text accompanying infra notes 74-84 for a discussion of these forum-
shopping activities.
70. Raustiala, supra note 63, at 1027.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1028.
73. Raustiala & Victor, supra note 61, at 280.
74. For excellent discussions of "regime shifting" or "forum shifting," see generally
JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHos, GLOBAL BustNEss REGULATION 564-71 (2000); Laur-
ence R. Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Helfer, Regime
Shifting].
75. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 74, at 14 (footnote omitted).
76. See id. at 16.
77. See id.
Michigan State Law Review
within the regime from multilateral fora to bilateral or regional ones, less
developed countries have responded by moving horizontally from the WTO
or WIPO to other multilateral fora, most notably the public health, human
rights, and biological diversity regimes." As regime-shifting activities con-
tinue and accelerate, the regime complex is likely to be enlarged to incorpo-
rate new actors, institutions, and issue areas.
Commentators generally believe that less developed countries have
limited ability to shift from one regime to another due to power asymmetry
in the international trading system. As John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos
noted emphatically, "[f]orum-shifting is a strategy that only the powerful
and well-resourced can use."79 However, Professor Heifer's recent research
suggests that "regime shifting is a game that both strong and weak actors
can play."' As he pointed out, less developed countries can benefit from
regime shifting in at least four different ways. First, "[r]egime shifting al-
lows state and nonstate actors, particularly those that have been ignored or
marginalized in other international regimes, to experiment with alternative
ways to achieve desired policy outcomes."8' Second, regime shifting pro-
vides a safety valve that states and interest groups can use to "consign[] an
issue area to a venue where consequential outcomes and meaningful rule
development are unlikely to occur." 2 Third, regime shifting creates "a 'safe
space' in which [governments can] analyze and critique those aspects of
TRIPs that they find to be problematic." 3 Finally, regime shifting "func-
tion[s] as an intermediate strategy that allows developing countries to gen-
erate the political groundwork necessary for new rounds of intellectual
property lawmaking in the WTO and WIPO." 4
Taken together, the development of a regime complex and the prolif-
eration of regime-shifting activities have resulted in a very complicated
conglomerate regime that has incorporated not only new actors, institutions,
and issue areas, but also divergent principles, norms, rules, and values.
From the standpoint of international intellectual property policy, the salient,
yet disturbing, characteristics of a regime complex are incoherence, incon-
sistency, and fragmentation.
In a regime complex, inconsistencies and conflicts can be developed
in three different ways. First, they develop inevitably as new actors and
institutions emerge and as new issue areas are incorporated into the regime
78. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 8, at 408-16 (discussing and
mapping the regime shifting phenomenon).
79. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHos, supra note 74, at 565.
80. Heifer, Regime Shifting, supra note 74, at 17.
81. Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
82. Id. at 56.
83. Id. at 58.
84. Id. at 59.
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complex. As Professors Braithwaite and Drahos pointed out, "[e]ach inter-
national organization has different rules by which it operates and so offers
different games and different pay-offs.""5 Thus, "[a]s the number of institu-
tions within the international system grows-and with new international
agreements, new organizations, and new actors increasingly engaged in
varied aspects of global governance-it is inevitable that some of these
agreements, organizations, and actors will overlap and even conflict with
one another."86
Second, players who are dissatisfied with an earlier rule in an existing
regime will intentionally develop inconsistencies within the regime complex
in the hope of changing that unfavorable rule. Termed "strategic inconsis-
tencies" by Professors Raustiala and Victor, these inconsistencies "occur[]
when actors deliberately seek to create inconsistency via a new rule crafted
in another forum in an effort to alter or put pressure on an earlier rule." 7 To
many countries, creating such inconsistencies is desirable because they may
help pave the way for future rule or regime changes. To compete for domi-
nance in an issue area or to attract new members, some institutions may also
actively create conflicting rules and standards within the larger regime
complex. Commentators, for example, have noted the growing rivalry, or at
least competition,88 between WIPO and the WTO, even though the two in-
stitutions continue to cooperate actively.89
Finally, the increased complexity of the international intellectual
property regime has upset existing coalition dynamics between actors and
institutions within the regime complex. Unlike a single-issue forum, the
interests of these countries are less likely to coincide when other issue areas
are incorporated into the regime. Countries therefore are less likely to align
85. BRAITHWArrE & DRAHOS, supra note 74, at 565.
86. Raustiala, supra note 63, at 1024 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 1027-28 (footnote omitted).
88. As Graeme Dinwoodie noted:
The sudden emergence of the WTO as part of the international intellectual property
lawmaking process seemed to energize WIPO, resulting in the conclusion of sev-
eral new treaties in copyright, patent and trademark law, as well as the reorganiza-
tion mentioned above that was designed to make WIPO fit for the twenty-first cen-
tury.
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Architecture of the International Intellectual Property System, 77
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 993, 1005 (2002) (footnotes omitted). In the past decade, WIPO has
served as the negotiating forum for the protection of audiovisual performers, broadcasters'
rights, and traditional knowledge. It has also been actively involved in the Internet domain
name process, in particular in the development of the model policy used in resolving disputes
in generic top-level domains.
89. For a discussion of the inter-institutional relationship between WIPO and the
WTO, see generally Frederick M. Abbott, Distributed Governance at the WTO-WIPO: An
Evolving Model for Open-Architecture Integrated Governance, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 63
(2000); Samuelson, supra note 9.
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around the same sets of principles, norms, rules, and values. As Professor
Okediji pointed out:
[T]o the extent regime shifting upsets coalitional dynamics between developing
countries, the loss on the development side is actually doubled. Not only is there a
dilution of a normative proposition, however subtle, but there is also the political
loss resulting from splinters between developing countries whose membership in
various regimes may be different, or whose position on issues within the regimes
may differ.90
In fact, commentators have suggested that the active regime-shifting
activities and the growing complexity of the international intellectual prop-
erty regime may harm less developed countries more than they harm their
developed counterparts. In a forthcoming article, Eyal Benvenisti and
George Downs describe three ways in which the growing proliferation of
international regulatory institutions with overlapping jurisdictions and am-
biguous boundaries has helped powerful states to preserve their dominance
in the international arena. As they explain:
First, by creating institutions along narrow functionalist lines and restricting the
scope of multilateral agreements, it limits the opportunities that weaker actors have
to build the cross-issue coalitions that are necessary to increase their bargaining
power and influence. Second, the ambiguous boundaries and overlapping authority
created by fragmentation dramatically increase the transaction costs that intema-
tional legal bodies must incur in trying to reintegrate or rationalize the resulting le-
gal order. Third, by suggesting the absence of design and obscuring the role of in-
tentionality, fragmentation frees powerful states from having to assume responsi-
bility for the shortcomings of a global legal system that they themselves have
played a preponderant role in creating.
9 1
According to Professors Benvenisti and Downs, "[p]owerful states are
drawn to this strategy because they know that weaker states are not only
more numerous than they are, but they are also far more diverse with re-
spect to size, wealth, and their level of development." '2
In recent years, commentators and policymakers have begun to focus
on the coherence of intellectual property policies, in addition to the mainte-
nance of balance and flexibility in those policies.93 For example, the re-
cently released U.K.-commissioned Gowers Review of Intellectual Property
emphasized the need for developing coherent intellectual property instru-
ments.94 As it stated:
90. Okediji, International Relations of Intellectual Property, supra note 13, at 373.
91. Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire's New Clothes: Political
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=976930.
92. Id. at 19.
93. See, e.g., ANDREW GowERs, GowERs REVIEw OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 45
(2006), available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/6/E/pbrO6_gowers-rep-
ort_755.pdf.
94. See id. at 58-61.
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The IP rights available within the UK must be both internally and externally coher-
ent. They must cover myriad ways in which knowledge is applied and ideas pro-
tected, and must also be integrated with other national and international systems of
rights, particularly in light of globalisation. Moreover, there should be certainty
and consistency in rights. Investment in knowledge-based industries should be
grounded in a predictable legal framework for the protection of that knowledge.
Finally, rights can only be coherent if they are simple enough to be understood by
the general public as well as by IP specialists.95
Although commentators and policymakers tend to focus on the coher-
ence of domestic intellectual property policies, the coherence of interna-
tional intellectual property policies is likely to be more important and more
challenging. Today, the intellectual property system is no longer considered
a closed system; the principles, norms, rules, and values created in that sys-
tem have greatly impacted many other systems, including trade, agriculture,
health, the environment, education, culture, competition, free speech, de-
mocracy, and the rule of law. The converse is also true. Developments in
other systems have significantly impacted the intellectual property system.
As I noted in the introduction to the Inaugural Annual Intellectual Property
and Communications Law Symposium in this Review, it is important to take
a holistic view of intellectual property developments and consider intellec-
tual property laws and policies as one of the many components of a larger
"information ecosystem."9  In a recent article discussing the access-to-
medicines problem, I have also shown how IP-relevant, IP-related, and IP-
irrelevant factors affect each other in a complex, symbiotic manner.97
These observations are not new. In economic and legal literature,
commentators have repeatedly underscored the importance of complemen-
tary factors to the causal linkage between intellectual property protection
and economic growth and development. Edwin Mansfield, for example,
noted that "one should recognize that a country's system of intellectual
property protection is inextricably bound-up with its entire legal and social
system and its attitudes toward private property; it involves much more than
95. Id. at 58.
96. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 15-18.
97. IP-relevant factors are factors that are directly affected by intellectual property
protection. IP-related factors are factors that are only indirectly affected by such protection.
IP-irrelevant factors are factors that are largely unaffected by such protection. See Yu, The
International Enclosure Movement, supra note 2, at 852-53; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG.
COMM'N ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB. HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH,
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 175 (2006) ("The process of drug discov-
ery and development is not only a matter of science. It involves a complex interaction
among a wide range of economic, social, and political actors."), available at
http://www.who.int/entity/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.p
df.
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the passage of a patent or copyright law."98 Paul Heald also stated that "a
rational strategy for developing countries must not only consider compli-
ance options, but must also account for institutional competency-
legislative, judicial, executive, and diplomatic-in order to make the most
of available options."
As intellectual property protection continues to expand and interna-
tional regimes become more interconnected, a focus on the intellectual
property system alone is unlikely to fully account for the extent of protec-
tion within the system. In an aptly titled article, Some Things Cannot Be
Legislated, Robert Sherwood reminded us that, "until judicial systems in
developing and transition countries are upgraded, it will matter little what
intellectual property laws and treaties provide." ' One therefore needs to
better understand the political, economic, social, cultural, technological, and
judicial environments that enable effective intellectual property enforce-
ment-something I have described elsewhere as the "enabling environment
for effective intellectual property protection." ' This enabling environment
is important because it provides the key preconditions for successful intel-
lectual property law reform, including a consciousness of legal rights, re-
spect for the rule of law, an effective and independent judiciary, a well-
functioning innovation and competition system, and a critical mass of local
stakeholders. As Keith Maskus, Sean Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha
noted in the Chinese context:
Upgrading protection for IPRs alone is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
th[e] purpose [of maximizing the competitive gains from additional innovation and
technology acquisition over time, with particular emphasis on raising innovative
activity by domestic entrepreneurs and enterprises]. Rather, the system needs to be
strengthened within a comprehensive and coherent set of policy initiatives that op-
timize the effectiveness of IPRs. Among such initiatives are further structural re-
form of enterprises, trade and investment liberalization, promotion of financial and
innovation systems to commercialize new technologies, expansion of educational
opportunities to build human capital for absorbing and developing technology, and
specification of rules for maintaining effective competition in Chinese markets.
10 2
98. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer 20 (Int'l Fin. Corp., Discussion Paper No. 19, 1994).
99. Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion
and Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 252 (2003).
100. Robert M. Sherwood, Some Things Cannot Be Legislated, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L
& Comp. L. 37, 42 (2002).
101. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puz-
zle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 213 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., forthcoming
2007) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle].
102. Keith E. Maskus, Sean M. Dougherty & Andrew Mertha, Intellectual Property
Rights and Economic Development in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
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In sum, if one is to fully understand the extent and impact of protec-
tion of intellectual property rights, one has to look beyond the intellectual
property system to examine the various complementary factors that affect
the development of an environment that enables effective protection of in-
tellectual property rights. In short, the intellectual property system cannot
be viewed in isolation! One must also pay attention to the growing devel-
opments in the international intellectual property regime complex, as these
developments can affect the type of enabling environment a country can
build or is building. As Professor Raustiala has noted: "[B]eing an expert
on TRIPS or the Madrid Agreement becomes relatively less useful, and
understanding how the broader IP regime complex operates becomes rela-
tively more useful. One must understand the regime complex to understand
fully any particular regime. 1 °3
To help us better understand the regime complex and how different
complementary factors operate, this Symposium maps intellectual property-
related developments in seven different international regimes or fora-
intellectual property, international trade, public health, human rights, bio-
logical diversity, food and agriculture, and information and communica-
tions. Such mapping is important for two reasons. First, by expanding cov-
erage to include developments in other international regimes or fora, this
Symposium better captures the growing developments in the intellectual
property area, while maintaining a holistic perspective in assessing those
reforms needed to promote creativity and innovation and to improve the
overall international framework. Second, by bringing the various develop-
ments together, the Symposium enables one to better understand the interac-
tions and policy interfaces among the different regimes, as well as the rami-
fications of rulemaking in the intellectual property area.
II1. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SCHIZOPHRENIA
The final notion concerns what I describe here as "intellectual prop-
erty schizophrenia"-a mental disorder that seems to have struck intellec-
tual property policymakers due to a wide variety of conflicts and competing
interests within a country. Symptoms of this disorder include the inability
to develop a coherent intellectual property policy; hallucinations about the
existence or the expediency of a single, uniform international intellectual
property system; and delusions that what works well for one region, sector,
or group would work well for another. As the policy focus is broadened and
other issue areas are incorporated into the international intellectual property
DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 295, 297 (Carsten Fink &
Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
103. Raustiala, supra note 63, at 1029-30.
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regime complex, more conflicts are likely to arise, and the symptoms will
worsen.
In fact, the conflicts and competing interests described in this Part will
help explain why coalition dynamics may change significantly as the regime
complex expands. As Tai-Heng Cheng noted recently, "[a]n accurate ex
ante analysis of the strategies of participants in global IP conflicts should
... account for the interests of internal constituencies and assess each con-
stituency's influence over internal decisionmaking in the particular IP con-
flict at issue."1" Because of the varied influence of each of these constitu-
encies and the many different stakes involved, countries may switch their
positions as more issue areas are incorporated into the regime complex.
In the introduction to the Inaugural Symposium, I wrote the following:
Those who are sympathetic to the plight of less developed countries often consider
themselves low-protectionists, who favor limited protection of intellectual prop-
erty. To them, it is very important to have more access to generic drugs, open
source software, and non-copyright-protected textbooks. However, as far as tradi-
tional knowledge is concerned, this group often finds itself on the side of high-
protectionists, along with Big Pharma and multinational agrochemical conglomer-
ates. As much as they want to have free and open access to copyrighted and pat-
ented products, they also believe that the same free access to indigenous knowl-
edge and materials would lead to biopiracy that could jeopardize the heritage and
culture of indigenous communities--or worse, threaten the very survival of these
communities.
Similarly, policymakers in less developed countries often find themselves con-
fronted with contradictory intellectual property policies. A case in point is India.
Because of its booming computer software and movie industries, it is logical for
policymakers in India to push for stronger protection of computer software and
audiovisual works. (They might also be interested in facilitating the development
of open source software.) However, this high-protectionist rhetoric has to be toned
down dramatically when dealing with patented chemicals, protected drugs, and
public health issues. Instead of stronger protection, the country will benefit from
weaker protection, or even special exceptions, for pharmaceuticals, chemicals,
food, and agricultural products.
105
This Essay provides me with an opportunity to further develop this observa-
tion by exploring the conflicts and competing interests that have made intel-
lectual property policies in many countries rather "schizophrenic."
Intellectual property schizophrenia is generally caused by three differ-
ent types of conflicts: regional conflicts, sectoral conflicts, and issue-based
conflicts. To help illustrate these conflicts, this Part focuses on China,
whose intellectual property law developments I have closely observed for
close to a decade. Although China is used as an illustration, similar devel-
104. Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law,
28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109, 117 (2006).
105. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, supra note 96, at 8-9
(footnotes omitted).
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opments are likely to take place in many less developed countries, in par-
ticular those that are undergoing significant transition in their intellectual
property regimes. These countries include Brazil, India, and Russia, which
along with China have been grouped together by two Goldman Sachs ana-
lysts as the so-called BRIC countries.' °6
A. Regional Conflicts
There is no better country to demonstrate regional conflicts than
China. Ever since Westerners first encountered the country many centuries
ago, they have become aware that the "Middle Kingdom" is not a homoge-
neous country. China is large, complex, diverse, and "sometimes internally
contradictory."'0 7 The Chinese speak different languages, enjoy different
cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and subscribe to different histori-
cal and philosophical traditions. Conditions in Beijing are often very differ-
ent from those in Guangzhou, intellectual property strategies that are effec-
tive in Shanghai are likely to fail in a village in western China, and the trade
patterns found in the coastal areas are very different from those found in the
inland areas.
To make things more complicated, during the rapid economic devel-
opment in China in the past two decades, "some regions have been posi-
tively encouraged to become wealthy before others."' 8 As Deng Xiaoping
declared in the early 1980s in response to the country's growing inequality,
"some people have to get rich first."'0 9 As a result of this rapid economic
development, there have been enormous disparities across the country in the
levels of wealth and income, the purchasing power of local consumers, and
the stages of economic and technological development. The goods that are
in high demand in the major cities and the more developed coastal areas are
often very different from those in the less developed inland and rural areas.
In the latter, limited economic and technological developments have
heavily constrained the amount of local resources that can be devoted to
research and development (R&D). A regional breakdown of 1995 technol-
ogy data supplied by the State Science and Technology Commission of
China showed that Beijing and Shanghai spent 2.6 and 1.4 percent of the
106. Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to
2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99, 2003), available at
http://www.gs.com/insight/research/reports/99.pdf.
107. John J. Hamre & C. Fred Bergsten, Preface to C. FRED BERGSTEN, BATES GILL,
NICHOLAS R. LARDY & DEREK MITCHELL, CHINA: THE BALANCE SHEET: WHAT THE WORLD
NEEDS TO KNOW Now ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER ix (2006).
108. David S.G. Goodman, The Politics of Regionalism: Economic Development,
Conflict and Negotiation, in CHINA DECONSTRUCTS: POLITICS, TRADE AND REGIONALISM 1
(David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., 1995).
109. BERGSTEN, GILL, LARDY & MITCHELL, supra note 107, at 31.
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local gross domestic product on R&D, as compared to 0.6 percent spent by
Sichuan and Liaoning, the two provinces that came next in R&D spend-
ing."' It is therefore no surprise that, in 2000, "[r]esidents of Guangdong
applied for more than 21,000 patents, while people in Hebei applied for
only 3,848.' If greater R&D efforts can lead to greater improvement of
intellectual property protection, the R&D statistics in China certainly hint at
the uneven progress made within the country.
Moreover, since the reopening of the Chinese market to foreign trade
in the late 1970s, the country has been heavily decentralized. Today, there
are considerable differences among protection at the national, provincial,
and local levels, due in no small part to the complex bureaucracies related to
intellectual property protection and enforcement." 2 The less developed
parts of the country are also likely to present considerable structural prob-
lems for intellectual property enforcement, including inefficient administra-
tion, low penalties, shortage of funds, local protectionism, and severe con-
flicts of interests. "' As far as enforcement of intellectual property rights is
concerned, the Chinese proverb "the mountains are high, and the Emperor is
far away" (shdn gdo hudngdi yudn) could not provide a more accurate de-
scription. As Former Assistant United States Trade Representative for Ja-
pan and China Joseph Massey recounted, shortly after the signing of the
1992 memorandum of understanding between China and the United States,
a senior USTR official "was told by a senior provincial government leader
that 'Beijing's agreement' with the US was 'mei you guanxi' (irrelevant) in
that southern province."" 14
Sadly, despite all the regional differences and the country's heavily
decentralized state, intellectual property developments in China are often
analyzed as if the country were homogeneous. While it is understandable
that policy analysts would swap analytical accuracy for practical conven-
ience, the end result unsurprisingly presents only half of the picture-at
times a very misleading, if not inaccurate, half. As the Chinese market ex-
pands further away from the major cities and the coastal areas, a more com-
plete and deeper analysis of the country's regional developments is in or-
der." 5
110. See Maskus, Dougherty & Mertha, supra note 102, at 320.
111. Id. at 317.
112. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 93-100 (2005).
113. See Maskus, Dougherty & Mertha, supra note 102, at 309.
114. Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China's Enforcement of Intellec-
tual Property Rights Protection, 1986-2006, 7 CH J. INT'L L. 231, 235 (2006).
115. In June 2006, the Office of the United States Trade Representative altered its
decades-old emphasis on country-based assessments in China. Instead of calling for infor-
mation only about the entire country, for the first time the Office requested information con-
cerning provincial developments. As the announcement in the Federal Register stated, "[t]he
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In the near future, China is likely to remain what I have described as
"a country of countries.""..6  Stronger intellectual property protection is
likely to appear in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other major cities
and coastal regions, due to greater intellectual property reforms and the
emergence of intellectual property-based industries. The massive piracy
and counterfeiting problems, however, are unlikely to migrate out of the
country. Instead, they will spread to the less developed parts of the country,
whose conditions are no different from those of the big cities a decade ago
when intellectual property protection began to strengthen. To strike a com-
promise between the divergent regional needs and interests, Chinese leaders
are likely to take some rather "schizophrenic," or pragmatic, positions in
designing their intellectual property policies. If we are to better understand
intellectual property developments in China--or, for that matter, the devel-
opments in any heterogeneous country that is undergoing significant transi-
tion in its intellectual property regime-we need to better understand the
regional conflicts within the country.
B. Sectoral Conflicts
While regional conflicts have greatly affected the analysis of intellec-
tual property protection in China, the country has also experienced diver-
gent sectoral developments that present challenges commonly found in less
developed or transition economies. Due to the varied paces at which differ-
ent industries develop and the fact that not all industrial sectors can simulta-
neously benefit from strong intellectual property protection, these countries
are unlikely to have a coherent national intellectual property policy. As a
result, the positions taken by the national governments often vary depending
on the impact of the proposed protection on their fastest-growing industries.
At times, their positions may seem "schizophrenic," due partly to the differ-
ent needs and demands of these industries.
For example, based on existing developments, China is likely to prefer
stronger protection of intellectual property rights in entertainment, software,
semiconductors, and selected areas of biotechnology to increased protection
in areas concerning pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and food-
stuffs. Such a position is understandable, because China has fast-growing
movie, software, semiconductor, and biotechnology industries. These in-
goal of this [special provincial] review is to spotlight strengths, weaknesses, and inconsisten-
cies in and among specific jurisdictions." Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Special
Provincial Review of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China: Request for Public
Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,969, 34,970 (June 16, 2006). On the benefits of this provincial
review, see Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, supra
note 101.
116. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 901, 963 (2006).
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dustries are likely to obtain greater benefits if intellectual property protec-
tion is strengthened. Even when policymakers fail to recognize the need for
stronger protection, they will provide the information needed to lobby for
intellectual property reforms.
By contrast, in fields concerning pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertiliz-
ers, seeds, and foodstuffs, China is unlikely to benefit from greater protec-
tion, due to its huge population, continued economic dependence on agricul-
ture, the worries about public health issues, and concerns about its people's
overall well-being. Indeed, because stronger intellectual property protection
in these areas is likely to drain the country's limited economic resources,
local leaders would hesitate to use their hard-earned political capital to in-
troduce reforms that would provide benefits primarily to foreign rights hold-
ers and their export countries. The likelihood of success for intellectual
property reforms in these sectors is also greatly reduced by the increased
frustration among the local people who would bear the costs of increased
protection and by the development of organized efforts against increased
protection.
Politics aside, it makes good economic sense for policymakers to de-
velop intellectual property protection that is in line with the country's eco-
nomic development. For example, economists have shown that the "length
of protection for a given product should be inversely related to the elasticity
of demand and the social rate of discount, and positively related to R&D
returns.""' 7 In his very influential study for the World Bank, Edwin Mans-
field found that "[t]here is often little correlation between one industry's
evaluation of the strength or weakness of intellectual property rights protec-
tion in a particular country and another industry's evaluation of the same
country."" 8  As he pointed out, intellectual property protection played a
major role in the chemical, pharmaceutical, machinery, and electrical
equipment industries, but has only marginal significance for the transporta-
tion equipment, metal, and food industries."9 Keith Maskus also found that
[i]nvestment in lower-technology goods and services, such as textiles and apparel,
electronic assembly, distribution, and hotels, depends less on the strength of IPRs
and relatively more on input costs and market opportunities. Investors with a
product or technology that is costly to imitate may also pay little attention to local
IPRs in their decision making.12
0
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In recent works, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have shown how policy
levers in patent law have allowed courts to take account of the varying types
of innovation in different industries.'21 As they noted, "there is no reason to
assume that a unitary patent system will optimally encourage innovation in
the wide range of diverse industries that it is expected to cover. 122 Like-
wise, Michael Carroll and Glynn Lunney have each highlighted the problem
of uniformity costs in intellectual property law.123 As these commentators
have recognized, the divergence of protection in different industrial sectors
will allow a country to better tailor its intellectual property system to the
needs of local industries. Such tailoring, in turn, would allow the country to
better utilize its comparative and competitive advantages. After all, a coun-
try that has a strong pharmaceutical industry is more likely to benefit from
an intellectual property system tailored to that industry's needs than one that
is designed to support a strong software industry.
As countries continue to fine-tune their intellectual property systems
in an effort to better reflect their different needs, interests, and goals, sector-
based disparities are likely to become of growing importance. In fact, the
international intellectual property regime has already seen increasing de-
mands for sector-based sui generis protection, usually from the beneficiary
sectors. For example, the wine and spirits industry successfully lobbied for
article 23 of the TRIPS Agreement, which offers special protection to geo-
graphical indications for wines and spirits." The plant breeding industry
successfully obtained special protection in article 27 of the Agreement,
which requires member states to "provide for the protection of plant varie-
ties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combi-
nation thereof.'' 2 In addition, the semiconductor industry gained protection
through the adoption of the Treaty on the Protection of Intellectual Property
in Respect of Integrated Circuits in article 35 of the Agreement.'26 There
have also been serious talks about implementing sui generis protection of
databases and traditional knowledge at the international level, thanks largely
to the push by relevant stakeholders.'27
121. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575 (2003).
122. Id. at 1577.
123. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intel-
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C. Issue-based Conflicts
The last type of conflict occurs when intellectual property issues are
discussed in the larger context involving other issue areas, such as interna-
tional trade, human rights, public health, free speech, privacy, democracy,
agricultural productivity, biological diversity, cultural patrimony, food secu-
rity, environmental sustainability, business ethics, global competition, scien-
tific research, sustainable development, and wealth distribution. As Part II
has shown, the development and expansion of the international intellectual
property regime complex has greatly increased the likelihood of developing
these conflicts.
Consider, for example, the tension between intellectual property and
human rights.128 In the early 1990s, there was significant tension between
the Clinton administration's foreign intellectual property policy toward
China and its foreign human rights policy. During the 1992 presidential
election campaign, then-Governor Bill Clinton accused his predecessor of
"coddling dictators" and vowed to condition China's most-favored-nation
benefits upon improvement in its human rights conditions. Although his
administration began its trade policy by linking together the two issues, it
eventually reversed the policy by de-linking human rights from international
trade (and intellectual property).129
On one side of this debate were intellectual property rights holders
who lobbied aggressively for stronger protection and enforcement in China,
in particular for the protection of computer software and entertainment me-
dia products. In response to these lobbying efforts, the United States re-
peatedly threatened China with economic sanctions, trade wars, non-
renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China's entry into
the WTO. 3° These threats eventually led to the issuance or signing of two
memoranda of understanding in 1989 and 1992, an agreement regarding
128. Intellectual property and human rights are not always in conflict. In fact, some
attributes or forms of intellectual property rights are protectible under international human
rights instruments. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for
Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing
Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1039
(2007); Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights,
23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-979193.
129. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in
China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 213 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners 1]. As Andrew Mertha explained, the linkage between international trade
and human rights has been particularly difficult in China because, "in the compartmentalized
world of Chinese bureaucratic politics, the 'human rights' portfolio does not appear any-
where within the jurisdiction of Chinese trade officials." MERTHA, supra note 112, at 11.
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intellectual property rights in 1995, and an "accord" reiterating China's
commitment to strengthening intellectual property protection in 1996.3
On the other side of the debate were human rights advocates in China
who became particularly concerned about the lack of protection of civil
liberties and human rights after Tiananmen in 1989. Their worries were
compounded when local authorities enlisted tough law enforcers who were
notorious for gross human rights violations to clean up pirate factories.
13 2
As Ted Fishman reminded us in his bestseller, China Inc., raids on piracy
and counterfeiting goods can also be attributable to other ulterior motives,
such as the suppression of political speech or turf wars:
The purposes behind the publicized raids are always obscure, and the Chinese who
read about them are skeptical about taking the raids at face value. Are they the re-
sult of turf wars among the government fiefdoms that are themselves knee-deep in
counterfeiting? Did the raided factories push the Party's tolerance of violent and
eroticized Western entertainment too far? Did they pirate a movie backed by the
Chinese government? Or was that day's demonstration of will just a show for a
foreign trade group coming to China to-yet again--express its grave concerns
over intellectual-property theft?133
In fact, by advocating a foreign intellectual property policy that relies
heavily on pressure and ultimata to protect economic interests, the United
States has jeopardized its longstanding interests in promoting human rights
and civil liberties in China.'34 As William Alford pointed out, that policy
not only discredited the very important message that one should respect
rights and the legal process, but also provided China with "a convenient
legitimization for repressive measures [the Chinese authorities] intended to
take in any event while simultaneously constraining America's capacity to
complain about such actions."' 35
Thus, when the administration took into account the interests of both
sides, finding a workable solution became particularly difficult. As Joseph
Massey recalled, the United States decided not to press for criminal penal-
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the United States, May 19, 1989, P.R.C.-U.S., reprinted in PRC Agrees to Push for Copy-
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881 (1995); China Implementation of the 1995 Intellectual Property Rights Agreement, June
17, 1996, P.R.C.-U.S., available at http://www.mac.doc.gov/TCC/DATA/index.html.
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ties for intellectual property piracy in the early-to-mid 1990s because of its
concern about political repression in China. 36 Although many in the ad-
ministration considered that approach appropriate at that time, it eventually
backfired by creating considerable intellectual property enforcement prob-
lems down the road. Today, criminal enforcement remains one of the
thorniest issues involved in the U.S.-China bilateral intellectual property
dispute. In the United States' recent WTO complaint against China, for
example, the lack or inadequacy of criminal enforcement and procedures in
intellectual property laws was listed as a key item to be addressed through
the mandatory dispute resolution process."'
Similar tension between intellectual property and human rights exists
elsewhere. Increasingly, countries, especially those in the less developed
world, are asked to offer stronger intellectual property protection at the ex-
pense of equally important interests in protecting privacy, free speech, and
other individual liberties. In a recently released consultation document on
digital copyright reform, the Hong Kong government advanced proposals to
increase protection of copyrighted works in the digital media.' Unfortu-
nately, many of those proposals also threaten to undermine the protection of
privacy, free speech, and other individual liberties in the region. As I noted
in a recent opinion piece in the South China Morning Post, "some of the
medicine prescribed in the [consultation] paper is, unfortunately, worse than
the diseases it claims exist."' 39
One proposal, for example, offers to "provide a specific mechanism
under the law for copyright owners to compel [Internet service providers] to
disclose their clients' information and to impose a requirement under the
[Copyright] Ordinance for [these providers] to keep logs.""1 This proposal
is particularly problematic in light of Yahoo's recent release to the Chinese
authorities of the personally-identifying information of Shi Tao, a Hunan
newspaper reporter who provided to a pro-democracy website a government
136. See Massey, supra note 114, at 234.
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HONG KONG: PROMOTING CREATIVITY WITHOUT SACRIFICING FREE SPEECH (2007), available
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139. Peter K. Yu, The Digital Divide, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 10, 2007, at
A15.
140. COMMERCE, INDUS. & TECH. BUREAU, supra note 138, at 24.
[Vol. 2007:1
Spring] International Intellectual Property Regime Complex 31
document on press restrictions."' That journalist was subsequently arrested
and was harshly sentenced to ten years in prison.
From the larger policy standpoint, it is hard to overlook the catch-22
situation in which the Hong Kong government found itself. If it does not
offer stronger copyright protection, the Western press is likely to criticize
the government for inadequate response to the massive file-sharing activi-
ties conducted online by local Internet users. Unsurprisingly, such criti-
cisms would resonate well with those who are concerned about the lack of
respect for the rule of law and intellectual property rights in China. How-
ever, if the government increases copyright protection, the Western press is
likely to criticize Hong Kong for its lack of protection of privacy, free
speech, and other individual liberties. Such criticisms were particularly
troublesome in light of the heightened media scrutiny following the tenth
anniversary of China's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong. Re-
gardless of the action it takes, the Hong Kong government is likely to be-
come a target of criticism by the Western press-ironically, for its efforts to
respond to Western concerns.
While tension exists between intellectual property and human rights,
due partly to the inherent tension between the different policy goals, con-
flicts arise even when the issues are narrowed down to trade alone. On the
surface, trade issues go hand in hand with intellectual property protection.
Today, information and high-technology goods make up a considerable part
of the economy of developed and emerging economies. To promote growth
in the area, intellectual property industries have lobbied heavily and suc-
cessfully for the "marriage" of intellectual property and international trade
through the TRIPS Agreement.
In reality, intellectual property policies tend to benefit one group of
industries at the expense of another. In an earlier work, I discussed how the
Chinese leaders were able to respond to the United States' threat of intellec-
tual property-related trade sanctions by switching from U.S. products to
European and Japanese ones. In 1996, for example, Chinese Premier Li
Peng went to France to sign a $1.5 billion order for thirty short-haul Airbus
planes following the United States' threat of trade sanctions against China
over its lack of intellectual property protection.142
From the standpoint of international trade, the move by the Chinese
leaders was ingenious. While the U.S. intellectual property industries
claimed that trade sanctions were needed to protect them from a potential
141. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, China's Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Ya-
hoo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 4, at 13; Clive Thompson, Google's China Problem (and
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Internet Lions Turn Paper Tiger in China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2006, at C3.
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loss of $2 billion of intellectual property-based goods and services,'43 Boe-
ing registered an immediate loss of $1.5 billion worth of contracts to its
European archrival, Airbus. In the end, the response by the Chinese leaders
skillfully transformed the issue from a bilateral intellectual property dispute
to a domestic cross-industry trade dispute concerning the United States'
overall interests. As executives from the powerful Boeing Company would
ask following the Airbus deal, "The importance of protecting intellectual
property rights is undeniable, but why should we suffer to help reduce the
loss by the entertainment industries?"'"
Indeed, similar concerns arose when the United States imposed trade
sanctions against Brazil. As Robert Bird recounted:
[D]rug companies in the 1980s cited Brazil for its failure to provide intellectual
property rights for patents in the pharmaceutical sector. After continued negotia-
tions between Brazilian and U.S. representatives proved unfruitful, the United
States imposed economic sanctions against numerous Brazilian products, including
paper products, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, microwave ovens, television cameras,
telephone answering machines, tape recorders, moccasins, pistols, and jewelry.
Once the government announced the trade sanctions, General Electric protested the
tariffs against imported electrical breakers, Xerox opposed the inclusion of copy
paper, Dow Chemical objected to the tariffs on carbon tetrachloride, Ford Motor
called for the removal of amplifiers and windshield wipers, and Carrier sought the
removal of air conditioners from the tariffs target list. Each of these companies
claimed that the sanctions harmed their economic interests because they relied on
the importation of the targeted products to satisfy consumer needs. 45
In sum, countries have internal conflicts and competing interests, and
policymakers face varying pressure from different regions, sectors, and in-
terest groups. When more issue areas are incorporated into the international
intellectual property regime complex, the inconsistent interests and policy
goals are likely to become apparent, creating what I have described here as
intellectual property schizophrenia. While regional and sectoral conflicts
occur primarily within those countries that seek to undertake intellectual
property reforms, issue-based conflicts occur not only in those countries,
but also in the more developed ones that seek to pressure others to acceler-
ate their intellectual property reforms. As the international intellectual
property regime continues to expand, the three types of conflicts described
in this Part will make the already very complicated conglomerate regime
even more complex.
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CONCLUSION
A few decades ago, intellectual property was not perceived as a major
topic in the national and international policy debates. As commentators
have noted ad nauseum, intellectual property was the backwater in the legal
field. Susan Sell compared intellectual property law to the Catholic Church
when the Bible was in Latin. As she wrote, "IP lawyers are privileged pur-
veyors of expertise as was the Latin-trained clergy." '146 Similarly, Andrew
Gowers noted in his U.K.-commissioned review, "For many citizens, Intel-
lectual Property... is an obscure and distant domain-its laws shrouded injargon and technical mystery, its applications relevant only to a specialist
audience."'47
Today, the field of intellectual property has come of age, and the in-
ternational intellectual property regime has become increasingly complex.
As more interests and policy goals are taken into consideration, this regime
complex is confronted with a wide variety of conflicts and inconsistencies.
Understanding the developments within the regime has become particularly
difficult. Fortunately, with the growing understanding and appreciation of
intellectual property laws and policy and the enlargement of the national
and international policy debates, the growing complexity of the interna-
tional intellectual property regime can be seen in a new light and can be
analyzed more deeply.
To help us better understand this international intellectual property re-
gime complex, the Intellectual Property & Communications Law Program
at Michigan State University College of Law and the Michigan State Law
Review co-organized a two-day conference on April 7-8, 2006. This con-
ference brought together academics, development specialists, international
relations scholars, trade experts, economists, political scientists, and poli-
cymakers to explore the interactions and policy interfaces among the vari-
ous international regimes in which intellectual property issues play a grow-
ing role. The conference also explored issues concerning international rela-
tions, public international law, enforcement and compliance, and the recent
proliferation of bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements.
This Symposium Issue collects some of the papers presented at the confer-
ence. I hope you will enjoy them.
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